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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                        
_____________ 
 
No. 15-2351 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
AUGUSTINE DECRUZ, 
           Appellant  
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
District Court No. 3-11-cr-00199-001 
District Judge: The Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
February 29, 2016 
 
Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN, and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 16, 2016)  
_____________________ 
 
OPINION* 
_____________________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 
                                           
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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 A confidential informant (CI) advised a police officer in late January of 
2011 that he could purchase cocaine from a man named Gus.  After the CI 
contacted Gus by telephone, the police officer verified the CI was clean, provided 
him money for a controlled buy, drove to Gus’s house, and watched as the CI 
entered the rear of the house and then emerged four minutes later with a substance 
that field tested positive for cocaine.  In early February, the CI made a second 
controlled buy from Gus while the same police officer again watched from his 
vehicle.  The purchased substance again field tested positive for cocaine. 
 Thereafter, the police officer swore out an affidavit and obtained a search 
warrant for Gus’s house.  Execution of the search warrant found Augustine DeCruz 
on the second floor in the hall, together with crack cocaine and two firearms, a 
Rossi .38 caliber handgun and a Ruger P95 9 mm handgun.  DeCruz was arrested 
and detained.  While DeCruz was incarcerated, his cellmate contacted the police to 
advise that DeCruz had bragged that the search had failed to discover a firearm in 
the basement and crack cocaine in folded laundry.  Execution of a second search 
warrant produced a Remington rifle and an additional 151.7 grams of crack 
cocaine.  
 In June of 2011, a grand jury returned a three-count indictment charging 
DeCruz with possession with the intent to distribute 28 grams of a controlled 
substance containing crack cocaine; possession of the Rossi, the Ruger and the 
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Remington rifle in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime; and possession of a 
firearm by an alien who was unlawfully in the United States.  DeCruz filed a 
pretrial motion seeking, inter alia, to suppress evidence seized during execution of 
the two search warrants for lack of probable cause and to disclose the CI’s identity.  
Alternatively, DeCruz sought a Franks hearing.1  The District Court denied 
DeCruz’s motion in its entirety.  Thereafter, pursuant to a written plea agreement, 
DeCruz waived his right to prosecution by indictment and entered a guilty plea to a 
two-count information charging him with possession with intent to distribute a 
substance containing an unspecified quantity of cocaine base and possession of 
only the Rossi and the Ruger handguns in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense.   
 Thereafter, DeCruz, represented by new counsel, moved to withdraw his 
guilty plea to the firearm offense.  He asserted that his inability to read and write 
English prevented him from fully understanding the consequences of his guilty 
plea and that he was innocent of the “charge related to the gun.”  A148.  During a 
hearing, DeCruz’s counsel admitted the crack cocaine was DeCruz’s, but asserted 
that DeCruz wanted to proceed to trial on the firearm offense because it was owned 
by someone else.  The District Court denied DeCruz’s motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea.  Thereafter, the Court sentenced DeCruz to 46 months for the drug 
                                           
1 See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). 
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trafficking offense and the 60 month mandatory minimum on the firearms offense 
to be served consecutively.2   
 On appeal, DeCruz contends the District Court erred in denying his pretrial 
motion to suppress evidence, to disclose the CI’s identity, and to conduct a Franks 
hearing.  DeCruz also asserts that the District Court erred by denying his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea.3   
 Given the police officer’s recitation in the affidavit of the circumstances 
leading up to and immediately following each of the two controlled buys, we agree 
with the District Court that the affidavit adequately established probable cause.  
See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (reaffirming that the probable cause 
determination requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances to 
                                           
2 DeCruz’s counsel failed to file an appeal as requested.  DeCruz filed a timely 
§ 2255 petition, asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  Consistent 
with a stipulation of the parties, the District Court ordered the reinstatement of 
DeCruz’s direct appeal rights.  This timely appeal followed.  The District Court 
had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2253(a) and 2255.  We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a). 
  
3 In reviewing the District Court’s denial of the motion to suppress, we conduct 
clear error review of factual findings and plenary review of legal conclusions.  
United States v. Riddick, 156 F.3d 505, 509 (3d Cir. 1998).  The denial of a motion 
to disclose the identity of a confidential informant is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion.  United States v. Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 149 (3d Cir. 2002).  We have 
yet to determine the standard of review for the denial of a Franks hearing, but need 
not resolve that standard here for reasons explained in the text.  United States v. 
Pavulak, 700 F.3d 651, 665-66 (3d Cir. 2012).  The abuse of discretion standard 
governs our review of the denial of DeCruz’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  
United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2003).  
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determine if “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will 
be found in a particular place”).  Because the probable cause determination for the 
first search warrant depended upon the police officer’s observations and not the 
CI’s report of what transpired in the house, the omission of the CI’s reliability and 
criminal history were not material to the finding of probable cause.  For that 
reason, the District Court did not err in denying either the motion to conduct a 
Franks hearing or to suppress the evidence.  In light of the criminal offenses 
charged in the indictment, there was no need to reveal the identity of the CI, whose 
earlier involvement in the controlled buys would not refute DeCruz’s possession 
on the day of the initial search and seizure of the crack and the handguns. 
 Nor are we persuaded that the District Court abused its discretion in denying 
DeCruz’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  In ruling on a motion to withdraw a 
plea, the court “must consider” three factors: “(1) whether the defendant asserts his 
innocence; (2) the strength of the defendant’s reasons for withdrawing the plea; 
and (3) whether the government would be prejudiced by the withdrawal.”  United 
States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2003).  The District Court appropriately 
considered these factors.  It noted that DeCruz did not assert his innocence as to 
the drug charge and that his alleged innocence on the firearms offense was based 
on his own uncorroborated statement that someone else owned the firearm 
(singular).  See A148, 161.  Notwithstanding DeCruz’s illiteracy, the District Court 
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reasoned that DeCruz’s active participation in the plea proceeding and solemn 
admission of guilt to the elements of each offense made DeCruz’s subsequent 
reason for withdrawing his plea “appear[]” to be “a change of heart,” which did not 
warrant granting the motion.  A174. 
 DeCruz’s contention that he did not understand the plea proceeding and that 
his plea was involuntary is belied by the transcript of the plea colloquy.  The 
transcript showed that DeCruz was fully engaged in the proceeding, asking 
questions and raising his concerns.  Moreover, his responses showed that he 
understood the significance of the information that had “dropped” not only a count 
from the indictment, but also the averment that the Remington rifle was used in 
furtherance of drug trafficking.  DeCruz made clear that he was pleading guilty 
solely to possession of what was seized in the first search and affirmed he 
understood the plea agreement.  When DeCruz raised concerns about sentencing 
and was ready to change his mind about pleading guilty, the hearing was continued 
only after DeCruz agreed that he decided to go forward with pleading guilty.  The 
Court then ensured that DeCruz understood his sentencing exposure, the 
mandatory minimum and the fact that the law required one sentence to get “tacked 
on to the other.”  DeCruz said he understood these sentencing considerations and 
had no hesitation when he pleaded guilty to each count.  These circumstances 
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support the District Court’s finding that DeCruz had a “change of heart,” which did 
not justify granting the motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
 For the above stated reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
